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Child Care Subsidies and the Stability and Quality of Child Care Arrangements 
 
Abstract 
Each month, the child care subsidy program helps nearly a million low-income families pay for 
child care. The financial support of a child care subsidy might be expected to increase stability 
and quality of care, which are characteristics of care that support child development. However, 
there are concerns that short durations of subsidy receipt may increase child care instability. 
Further, there is debate about whether subsidy receipt leads to the use of higher or lower quality 
care. In this study we use longitudinal survey data on low-income families and linked 
administrative data on subsidy receipt to investigate the stability and reported quality of child 
care arrangements. Because we observe the same children repeatedly over time, both when they 
are and are not receiving child care subsidies, we use child fixed-effects models to address the 
selection problems that otherwise would bias the relationships among subsidy, stability, and 
quality. We find that when children received child care subsidies they experienced higher quality 
care as reported by parents. Yet there was no difference in the stability of care arrangements 
while receiving subsidy compared to when not receiving subsidy. Additionally, children often 
had multiple providers concurrently, regardless of subsidy receipt. These results suggest that 
child care subsidy receipt may promote positive child outcomes due to increased access to higher 
quality care without worsening the stability of care. 
 
Keywords: child care; child care subsidy; child care instability; child care quality; child 
development; low-income families  
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Introduction 
Through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), child care subsidy programs 
support dual goals of encouraging parental employment and improving the quality of care for all 
children (Office of Child Care, 2015). With combined state and federal spending of $11.4 billion, 
1.5 million children were served monthly in federal fiscal year 2012 (Matthews & Schmit, 2014). 
A key element of the program is to increase access to care while promoting parental choice of 
care that best meets the family’s needs (Administration for Children and Families Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2014). Children receiving child care subsidies typically do so 
through a voucher that helps cover the cost of child care with an eligible provider who is selected 
by the family. The Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 2014, which reauthorized 
CCDF for the first time since 1996, added program goals to “reinforce parental and family 
choice in determining the best setting for children while also placing a renewed focus on the 
quality of care” (U.S. Senate Committee on Health Education Labor and Pensions, 2014, p. 5). 
The 2014 legislation also made a number of changes intended to increase the stability of care 
arrangements. Whether the child care subsidy program improves access to stable, high quality 
care is a question of substantial importance to policymakers. Thus, this paper, which investigates 
the relationships between subsidy receipt and the perceived quality and stability of children’s 
care, is particularly timely and relevant. 
Conceptual Model  
Families make decisions about child care arrangements within a complex landscape of 
constraints, options, social norms and inter-related decisions (Chaudry, Henly, & Meyers, 2010; 
Meyers & Jordan, 2006). Parents’ use of a particular child care arrangement has been described 
as an “accommodation” rather than a choice, balancing family needs and resources within a 
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specific social and geographic context (Meyers & Jordan, 2006). Parents’ decisions about which 
non-parental care arrangement(s) to use (if any) and if or when to change care underlie the 
stability and quality outcomes we examine in this study.  
The preferences-and-constraints model of family decision-making (Casper & Smith, 
2004) assumes that parents select the care arrangement that best meets the family’s needs given 
the time and budget constraints faced by the household, as well as their preferences and priorities 
(Becker, 1981; Connelly, 1992). Receiving a subsidy to help pay for child care may influence the 
type, frequency, quality and stability of child care arrangements used by a family. The financial 
support of a subsidy is expected to increase the set of options available to families (Adams & 
Rohacek, 2002), for instance making center care more affordable. Receiving a subsidy may 
allow families to use higher quality care or a more preferred care setting because subsidies 
increase the resources available to families, lessening their budget constraints. These subsidized 
arrangements may also be more stable, as parents using their preferred type of care are less likely 
to change child care arrangements (Gordon & Hognas, 2006). More resources may allow parents 
to use more, or fewer arrangements to accommodate work schedules as well as to meet child 
needs (Morrissey, 2008). 
However, even with a subsidy it may be the case that care alternatives are not available to 
parents, still not affordable to parents, or not preferred by parents (Chaudry, 2004; Chaudry et al., 
2011; Meyers & Jordan, 2006). For example, there may be no centers available or affordable 
locally, even with a subsidy, or families may prefer home-based care for an infant regardless of 
subsidy receipt. While receiving a subsidy may allow parents to choose higher quality care 
arrangements, parents must “prioritize” quality and be able to identify and locate higher quality 
care, which may not be available locally (Ryan, Johnson, Rigby, & Brooks-Gunn, 2011). Parents 
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may prefer a free public program such as Head Start or public pre-kindergarten for children who 
are eligible, if slots are available. Therefore, in some (but not all) cases, we expect that parents 
will use different child care arrangements when they receive child care subsidies than when they 
do not. If parents choose different care arrangements when receiving subsidies, these 
arrangements can potentially affect a host of outcomes. The characteristics of these different care 
arrangements may then affect child development outcomes (Belsky et al., 2007; Claessens & 
Chen, 2013; Dearing, McCartney, & Taylor, 2009; de Schipper, Van Ijzendoorn, & Tavecchio, 
2004; Howes & Hamilton, 1992; McCartney, Dearing, Taylor, & Bub, 2007; Pilarz & Hill, 2014; 
Tran & Weinraub, 2006). Thus, one potential pathway for subsidies to influence child 
development is by changing the child care arrangement choices parents make when receiving 
child care subsidies.   
The Present Study 
This paper exploits unique longitudinal survey data on low-income families in Minnesota 
linked with administrative data from the state child care subsidy program to investigate the 
relationship between receipt of child care subsidies and the stability and perceived quality of 
children’s care. Because we have longitudinal data on receipt of subsidy and child care 
arrangements, we are able to use a different approach from previous studies to account for 
selection bias. We estimate child fixed effects models to compare child care outcomes for the 
same child over time and examine, when the child receives subsidy, whether stability and 
perceived quality are different than when the same child does not receive subsidy. 
Fundamentally we are studying the changes in outcomes when the child is in subsidized care 
compared to when she is not, using the child as her own control group. Our specific research 
questions are: 
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1) How does subsidy receipt alter the stability of child care arrangements? 
2) Is subsidy receipt related to the number of concurrent child care arrangements for 
a particular child? 
3) How does the perceived quality of care children experience differ depending on 
subsidy receipt? 
 
In investigating these research questions, we also explore mechanisms that might explain the 
impact of subsidy, by examining parents’ reasons for selecting different arrangements.  
 
Previous Empirical Evidence on Child Care Subsidies and Child Care Arrangements 
Child Care Subsidies and Child Care Stability 
Parents may change their child care arrangements for a variety of reasons, including 
dissatisfaction with the care, the arrangement closing, no longer being affordable, alternatives 
becoming available (including higher-quality alternatives), or changes in children’s 
developmental needs. While some changes may support child development, instability in child 
care, which is often measured as the frequency or probability of changing child care 
arrangements, can have negative effects on the emotional, behavioral, and cognitive development 
of children (Adams & Rohacek, 2010; de Schipper et al., 2004; Loeb, Fuller, Kagan, & Carrol, 
2004; Pilarz & Hill, 2014; Sandstrom & Huerta, 2013; Tran & Weinraub, 2006). Whether 
subsidies alter child care stability therefore is a question with important implications for child 
development.  
One reason for the concern that receipt of child care subsidies may increase child care 
instability is the short durations of subsidized care (“spells”) children experience. Nationally, the 
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median length of subsidy spells is around six months (Swenson, 2014). There is, however, 
substantial state-by-state variation with median state durations that range from 13 months 
(District of Columbia) to as short as 3 months (Nevada) (Swenson, 2014). The median length of 
subsidy spells in a previous study in Minnesota was eight months (Davis, Krafft, & Tout, 2014). 
Policies that require recertification of eligibility or other paperwork requirements may disrupt 
subsidy and contribute to child care instability (Davis, Krafft, & Forry, 2016; Grobe, Weber, & 
Davis, 2008). Short durations of subsidy receipt may include even shorter durations of 
subsidized care with a particular care provider (Henly et al., 2015; Weber, 2005). However, 
children may continue with the same provider when not receiving subsidy. In Wisconsin, 37% of 
children who exited and then returned to the subsidy program did so with the same provider (Ha, 
Magnuson, & Ybarra, 2012) and in Minnesota, half did so (Davis, Krafft, et al., 2014), 
suggesting that some children likely continued with the same provider even when not subsidized. 
While previous studies have shown that children receiving subsidies experience unstable 
care arrangements, children from low-income families in general also have substantial volatility 
in their child care arrangements (Adams & Rohacek, 2010; Chaudry, 2004; Lowe, Weisner, Geis, 
& Huston, 2005; Pilarz & Hill, 2014; Tran & Weinraub, 2006). For instance, more than half of 
children from low-income families changed their primary child care provider over a period of six 
months in both Minnesota and Maryland (Krafft, Davis, & Tout, 2014; Krafft, Davis, Tout, & 
Forry, 2013). Thus, there is not clear evidence whether child care subsidy recipients have more 
or less instability than other low-income families. Although one study of child care changes in 
Minnesota demonstrated that respondent-reported receipt of subsidy was not related to the 
probability of subsequent changes in primary provider (Davis, Carlin, & Krafft, 2014), that study 
was not able to correct for selection into the subsidy program. 
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Results from one randomized treatment-control study provide some causal evidence of 
the impact of subsidy receipt on child care stability. Families in Cook County, Illinois were 
randomly assigned to either receive or not receive a child care subsidy, and the study followed 
their patterns of care over time (Michalopoulos, Lundquist, & Castells, 2010). The authors 
concluded that child care subsidies increased care stability, since 92% of children who received 
subsidies never experienced an interruption in their primary care arrangement, compared to 89% 
of children who did not receive subsidies. While the study was based on a strong research design, 
the findings were based on child care histories that suffered from recall issues. For instance, the 
study surveyed families on their care arrangements one to two years after randomization. When 
asked retrospectively about child care at the time of random assignment, only 52% of subsidy 
recipients reported using non-parental care at that time, although to receive subsidy, all these 
families had to have been using non-parental care (Michalopoulos et al., 2010). In addition, the 
study included only individuals between 50% and 65% of the state median income, who were not 
likely to be representative of the low-income population typically eligible for subsidies. Thus, 
there is a need for additional research on how subsidy affects stability of care among low-income 
families.  
Child Care Subsidies and Use of Multiple Concurrent Care Arrangements 
While there exists debate on whether having multiple child care arrangements can itself be 
considered a form of child care instability (Adams & Rohacek, 2010), in this paper we 
distinguish between the concept of multiple concurrent care arrangements (multiplicity) and 
instability, that is whether a particular arrangement continues or ends. Research shows that 
multiple (concurrent) child care arrangements are common yet can have negative impacts on 
children’s development (Claessens & Chen, 2013; de Schipper et al., 2004; Morrissey, 2009; 
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Pilarz & Hill, 2014; Tran & Weinraub, 2006). Among infants, just half used only one 
arrangement at a time, and multiple arrangements included both temporary and longer-term 
situations (Tran & Weinraub, 2006). Parents use multiple arrangements for a variety of reasons, 
such as providing their children with a variety of early environments (e.g., both relative care and 
formal care promoting school readiness) or to cover the time parents spend in work or in school 
(Morrissey, 2008). Qualitative work on families transitioning from welfare to work highlights the 
role of multiple arrangements acting as a “patchwork” of care for children (Scott, London, & 
Hurst, 2005). Multiple arrangements may often be a necessity rather than a matter of preference.  
Few studies have examined the relationship between subsidy receipt and use of concurrent 
multiple providers. One approach is to compare the number of providers children have 
(Morrissey, 2008, 2009; Pilarz, Claessens, & Gelatt, 2016; Tran & Weinraub, 2006) to the 
number of subsidized providers children have (Davis, Krafft, et al., 2014; Weber, 2005). Such 
comparisons demonstrate that the average number of providers for children overall tends to be 
greater than the number of subsidized providers for a child receiving subsidy. This result 
indicates that either receiving a subsidy allows parents to use fewer providers or that even when 
using subsidies, parents may require additional unsubsidized providers to cover their children’s 
care needs. The Cook County study found subsidized children were less likely to have multiple 
providers (by three percentage points) (Michalopoulos et al., 2010), but as with the study’s other 
results, recall and generalizability are problematic. In Minnesota, children averaged 1.06 
subsidized providers per month and 25% of children experienced multiple providers within a 
spell of subsidy receipt. Most of the months with multiple providers were likely transitions from 
one provider to another (Davis, Krafft, et al., 2014). If families can meet all of a child’s care 
needs with a single provider when receiving a subsidy, the decrease in multiplicity of 
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arrangements may be a mechanism for positive impacts on children’s development. It may also 
be the case that families use a mix of both subsidized and unsubsidized arrangements, such that 
multiplicity is no different as a result of receiving subsidy. However, there is little direct 
evidence to date on this question.   
Child Care Subsidy and Child Care Quality 
The quality of care children experience has important implications for their short and 
long term development, particularly for children in low-income families (Belsky et al., 2007; 
Dearing et al., 2009; McCartney et al., 2007; Tran & Weinraub, 2006). Because child care 
subsidies lessen income constraints for families, parents may have a larger set of feasible choices 
and may be able to select more expensive, higher-quality child care (Adams & Rohacek, 2002). 
However, the evidence to date on whether subsidy receipt results in higher quality care has been 
mixed. A number of studies have found that those who receive child care subsidies are more 
likely to use center care (Burstein & Layzer, 2007; Crosby, Gennetian, & Huston, 2005; Ertas & 
Shields, 2012; Herbst, 2008; Marshall, Robeson, Tracy, Frye, & Roberts, 2013; Tekin, 2005; 
Weber, Grobe, & Davis, 2014; Weinraub, Shlay, Harmon, & Tran, 2005; Wolfe & Scrivner, 
2004). Center care is documented to be higher quality on average than other types of care on 
some indicators of quality (Bassok, Fitzpatrick, Greenberg, & Loeb, 2016; Bigras et al., 2010; 
Dowsett, Huston, Imes, & Gennetian, 2008; Fuller, Kagan, Loeb, & Chang, 2004) and can 
support developmental gains (Campbell, Ramey, Pugnello, Sparling, & Miller-Johnson, 2002; 
Loeb et al., 2004; NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, 2002; Reynolds & Temple, 
1998; Schweinhart & Weikart, 1998).  
While consistent evidence is found linking increased use of center-based care and 
subsidies, direct evidence on the relationship between subsidy receipt and quality of care is 
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mixed. Studies that compare providers who accept subsidies to those that do not generally report 
the former to be lower quality (Jones-Branch, Torquati, Raikes, & Edwards, 2004; Raikes et al., 
2013). Weinraub and colleagues (2005) found no relationship between subsidy and quality of 
care when focusing on a low-income sample. Several studies have linked child care subsidies 
with poorer developmental outcomes among subsidized children (Hawkinson, Griffen, Dong, & 
Maynard, 2013; Herbst & Tekin, 2010). The studies speculate, but do not demonstrate, that these 
poorer developmental outcomes may be due to low quality child care. Herbst and Tekin (2010) 
used instrumental variables methods and found that child care subsidies negatively impact child 
development, which they conjectured was because subsidized children were in lower quality care. 
However, Hawkinson, et al. (2013) note that their similar finding, that subsidy receipt had a 
negative association with child development outcomes, could be due to selection into the 
program. 
In contrast, several recent studies find a positive association between child care subsidies 
and child care quality after correcting for selection on observable characteristics by using 
propensity score matching (Johnson, Ryan, & Brooks-Gunn, 2012; Ryan et al., 2011). Two 
studies also find higher quality care used by those on subsidies compared to families on the 
waiting list (Berger & Black, 1992; Marshall et al., 2013). Thus the recent evidence using quasi-
experimental methods provides evidence that subsidy receipt results in use of higher quality care. 
The relationship between subsidy use and quality of care is likely to be more nuanced, however, 
and may vary with the type of care used. Ryan and colleagues (2011) concluded that while 
overall, quality was higher for those using subsidies, the result was due to the increased use of 
center-based care. Within care types, those using family child care while receiving subsidy used 
higher quality care, and those using centers used lower quality care, compared to families not 
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receiving subsidies. Further, Johnson et al. (2012) found that subsidy recipients experienced 
lower quality care than nonrecipients who accessed free public programs such as Head Start or 
public pre-kindergarten programs.  
Challenges in Identifying the Impact of Subsidy Receipt on Child Care Outcomes 
In addition to selecting child care arrangements, parents also make decisions with regard 
to applying for and taking up child care subsidies, if they are eligible. A major challenge in 
estimating the impact of child care subsidies on the stability and quality of care is that families 
who (choose to) receive subsidies may be different from families not receiving subsidies in ways 
that bias the observed relationships between subsidy, stability, and quality. For instance, the 
duration of child care arrangements may be short among low-income families regardless of 
subsidy status. So a relationship between subsidy receipt and instability of care could be driven 
by the fact that subsidy recipients have low incomes, and low-income families have less stable 
care. Or it may be that only families who value certain types of child care seek child care 
subsidies (Burstein & Layzer, 2007; Johnson, Martin, & Brooks-Gunn, 2011). If these care 
settings are of higher quality, then subsidy recipients would tend to be in higher quality care—
due to parental preferences for that type of care.  
Information that can be used to control for selection into the subsidy program is not 
readily available. In addition, to assess instability of care, longitudinal data are needed. Accurate 
data on both child care arrangements and subsidy receipt over time are needed for such studies. 
Self-reported or retrospective survey data are likely to suffer from substantial biases which could 
generate erroneous estimates (Krafft, Davis, & Tout, 2015; Michalopoulos et al., 2010).  
This study investigates the relationship between child care subsidy receipt, child care 
stability, multiplicity of arrangements, and the perceived quality of care. The analysis also 
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investigates mechanisms, such as type of care or reasons for having multiple providers, which 
might explain these relationships. Two of the key advantages of our current study are that we 
have longitudinal data (not retrospective data) on child care arrangements and in addition, we 
link the longitudinal survey data with administrative data to identify subsidy receipt. The use of 
administrative data is particularly important for accurately identifying the impacts of the subsidy 
program, as other studies have shown potential problems in measuring subsidy receipt in survey 
data (Johnson & Herbst, 2013; Krafft et al., 2015). Estimated program impacts will be biased if 
survey responses about subsidy receipt are inaccurate (Krafft et al., 2015). The current study 
contributes to the existing evidence with new methods and data that can help identify the impact 




Parents in Minnesota were recruited to participate in a longitudinal study examining child 
care arrangements, stability, perceptions of quality and use of financial assistance for child care. 
The parent survey recruited families with at least one child aged six or younger who had applied 
to receive financial assistance through Minnesota’s cash assistance programs (welfare or child 
care assistance). The sample was limited to families living in one of seven counties. Potential 
survey respondents were given packets of information about the study at the county social 
services office and asked if they would participate. Of the 437 families who agreed to participate 
in the study, 323 (74%) completed the baseline interview. The other families did not participate 
because 16 were not ultimately eligible, 24 later refused to participate when contacted, and 74 
could not be reached by telephone.  
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The telephone survey focused on the care arrangements for a randomly designated focal 
child under age six. The survey respondent was the person in the household with the most 
knowledge about the focal child’s care arrangements, usually the mother. Extensive information 
was collected about the child care arrangements used for this child at each survey wave. Detailed 
information on parents’ perceptions of elements of quality in the primary arrangement was 
gathered. The survey included rich information on child, family, and provider characteristics. 
Open-ended questions on issues such as why parents used multiple arrangements were also 
incorporated into the survey. Responses to these questions were examined to identify whether 
reasons were related to subsidy receipt. For more information about the survey design and 
sample, see Tout et al. (2011). 
All five waves of the survey were used in this study, and there were an average of six 
months between waves. The surveys were completed between August 2009 and August 2012. 
The baseline sample included 323 families. Survey participation rates dropped over time, mostly 
due to difficulties in locating the families, and it was possible for families to be missing in one 
wave but to return in a later wave. There were 250 families in Wave 2, 218 families in Wave 3, 
196 in Wave 4, and 146 in Wave 5. There were 133 families who completed all five waves. 
Because we use fixed effects models, as described below, our multivariate results are based on 
all families who responded to at least two survey waves, of which there are 259. We do not 
impute missing data for waves when families who attrited. We present descriptive statistics for 
all children and families observed in the baseline survey. We also provide statistics by wave of 
the survey and then “pool” the data across waves. When pooling, an observation is a child in a 
particular wave; children will have the number of observations in the pooled sample equal to the 
number of waves in which they are observed. Thus there are a total of 1,133 observations in the 
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pooled sample. Due to unique features of the outcomes we examine, some of which are changes 
over time, are restricted to a certain sub-group, or are limited to those with multiple waves of 
data, we do not have one single sample used for identification in our estimates. We describe the 
samples used for modeling with different methods in the estimation section, below, and present 
the characteristics of each analysis sample in the appendix.   
Administrative data on subsidy receipt and linking to survey data. 
The Minnesota Department of Human Services provided monthly administrative data on 
the families, children, and providers participating in the child care subsidy program through a 
data sharing agreement. With participant consent, survey responses were linked to the 
administrative records based primarily on respondent’s name, gender and date of birth. 
Additional variables such as home address and child’s date of birth and gender were confirmed 
as needed. Matching was done on a case-by-case basis and 98% of the survey respondents were 
found in the administrative database. The survey respondents were in the state database because 
of their application for and/or receipt of public benefits such as TANF, Medicaid or SNAP, 
regardless of whether they received child care subsidies. The linked administrative data were 
used only to identify whether children were receiving subsidy at the time of the survey and the 
number of subsidized providers they had. All other outcomes and covariates are from the survey 
data, in order to have this information for both subsidy recipients and non-recipients at each 
survey wave.  
Measures 
 Subsidy receipt. 
We define subsidy receipt in a given month using the administrative data based on 
whether the child utilized subsidized child care within that month. The administrative data 
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include the month(s) for which a provider was paid for child care services for the focal child. We 
refer to these months as the child ‘receiving’ or ‘utilizing’ subsidized child care throughout the 
paper (based on when the care was received). However, in Minnesota the provider may be paid if 
the child is absent for a short period. Using the monthly administrative data, we determined 
whether each child was receiving subsidy in each wave of the survey based on the calendar 
month in which the survey was completed.  
Stability. 
We calculated two measures of the stability of child care arrangements: (i) whether the 
child changed primary provider between survey waves and (ii) whether the child changed any 
provider (as some children had more than one provider concurrently) between waves. Survey 
respondents were asked about all child care arrangements for the focal child that were used at 
least once a week for the two weeks prior to the survey wave, so a one-time use of a babysitter, 
for instance, would not be included. The primary provider was defined as the arrangement used 
most often. Respondents were asked directly whether the primary provider was the same 
individual (or program) as in the previous wave. Some studies consider another form of 
instability to be changes of caregiver or teacher within the same program. Our data do not 
provide sufficient detail to measure changes at the caregiver level in a center or other multi-
caregiver setting.  
Children were defined as having a change in any provider if they changed primary 
provider or had stopped using a type of care or added a type of care between survey waves. 
Children who were in the same type of care but added or lost a provider within that care type 
also were defined as having a change in any provider. For children who had not changed type or 
number of providers, we compared the names of the providers for centers and out-of-home care. 
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Names were not provided for in-home care, but the type of provider (relative, friend, neighbor, 
professional babysitter) and relationship (grandparent, sibling, aunt/uncle, other) were compared. 
We assumed that if the relationship was the same, the same individual continued. When 
comparing names, we allowed for interviewer mis-spellings over time (Sheryl and Cheryl, for 
instance) to be considered continuing with the same provider.  
Number of providers. 
In the survey, respondents were asked whether they used different types of care, 
including center, before/after school, summer, in home, and out of home care at least once a 
week within the past two weeks. We included before/after school care and summer care, which 
were infrequent, with center care. School (grades kindergarten and above) was not included in 
our count of child care arrangements. For both out of home and in home care, respondents were 
asked about the number of providers they used. Unfortunately, individuals using center care were 
not asked how many different centers they used. We add the number of providers of each type to 
obtain the total number of (non-parental) providers. While using multiple providers at least once 
a week within the past two weeks may sometimes represent a transition rather than having 
multiple providers on a regular basis, given the short time window of the questions and the high 
numbers of providers we find, below, transitions likely represent a small share of the observed 
multiple arrangements.  
Parents’ perception of child care quality. 
There is an extensive literature on ways to conceptualize and measure quality of child 
care arrangements. This literature highlights both structural features (such as the child-teacher 
ratio and use of a curriculum) and process features reflecting the child’s experience (such as 
warm, positive interactions between the caregiver and child and the provision of 
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developmentally appropriate activities) as important elements of quality. Different measures and 
dimensions of quality are likely to be closely related. Thus, composite indices of quality 
combining structural and process features are common in the literature (Johnson et al., 2012; 
Loeb et al., 2004; Marshall et al., 2013; Ryan et al., 2011). In the survey, we asked parents about 
their child’s experience in the care setting including the parent’s perception of structural features 
in the setting (for example, whether the teacher/caregiver uses a tool to track the child’s 
development and whether the teacher/caregiver has formal training and education in the care of 
young children) and process features (for example, whether the teacher/caregiver provides 
individual attention and a variety of creative activities). The survey items were developed to 
mirror elements of quality included in Minnesota’s quality rating and improvement system 
(QRIS) for early care and education programs. Accordingly, the wording of parent survey items 
matched promotional materials for the QRIS aimed at supporting parental understanding of the 
quality features that are important for children’s school readiness (Tout et al., 2016). In addition, 
select items from a scale developed to measure parents’ perception of quality were adapted for 
the survey (Emlen, Koren, & Schultze, 2000). Parents’ perceptions of quality tend to be higher 
than observer ratings of quality, but are correlated with direct observations of quality (Mocan, 
2007). The inflation of quality ratings is less of a concern in the context of a fixed-effects model, 
where any fixed parental over-estimates of quality will be absorbed by the fixed effect. 
Essentially the model relates changes in perceived quality to changes in subsidy and other child 
and family characteristics. Further, as described below, parents were asked about specific actions 
and activities, from which we developed a quality measure, rather than asking parents for an 
overall quality or satisfaction rating.    
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In each wave the parent responded to 17 different items about the primary provider 
framed within two survey questions listed in Table 1. Responses for both sets of questions were 
(1) Never (2) Rarely (3) Sometimes (4) Usually, or (5) Always. The questions and response 
options were the same regardless of the type of care used. In Waves 2 and 4, these questions 
were not asked of individuals who neither changed primary provider nor considered a change; 
since they are with the same provider as the previous wave (wave 1 or wave 3) we use 
experiences in the previous wave as the inputs for the quality factor. The full distribution of 
parent responses to these questions is presented in Table 1. The distribution tends to be skewed 
towards “always” responses, particularly for characteristics like whether the child likes the 
provider and whether there’s a warm environment. However, there is a substantial degree of 
variation across respondents for the different questions.  
Parent responses to the 17 quality items were reduced using factor analysis. The primary 
factor identified in the analysis, with an eigenvalue of 3.94, identified elements of high quality, 
with all variables entering positively with the exception of watching more than an hour of 
television. We refer to this factor as the quality factor. Factor loadings, uniqueness and scoring 
coefficients are presented in Table 1. There are varying weights placed on the different indicators 
of quality, with creative activities, activities that fit the child’s needs, learning new skills, use of 
a curriculum, availability of books, tracking of children’s development using a formal tool, staff 
education, and diversity having particularly high weights. This pattern indicates an emphasis in 
the quality factor on more formal aspects of quality related to supports for children’s school 
readiness. The factor is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, so 
changes or differences in the quality factor can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations.  
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Because the literature (Burstein & Layzer, 2007; Crosby et al., 2005; Ertas & Shields, 
2012; Herbst, 2008; Tekin, 2005; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2004) suggests that accessing different 
types of care may be one mechanism through which subsidy impacts quality, we undertake 
additional analyses to investigate whether type of care mediates perceived quality effects. We 
divide types of care into three categories: centers, family child care (FCC), and 
family/friend/neighbor (FFN) care, as is common in the literature. The latter two are 
distinguished based on their professionalization. Care in the child’s home and care by relatives 
were classified as FFN. Otherwise, the parent was asked if the provider was a professional 
babysitter or nanny, if caregiving was the provider’s primary job, and whether the provider cared 
for children not related to the respondent or the provider. If the parent answered yes to these 
questions, the provider was classified as FCC. Otherwise, the provider was considered FFN care. 
We do not distinguish based on licensing status, as parents are often unable to provide accurate 
information on whether a provider is licensed by the state. 
    
Estimation  
Selection into the subsidy program and unobserved differences between subsidy 
recipients and non-recipients are important potential threats to validity when estimating the 
impact of subsidy receipt on child and family outcomes (Burchinal & Nelson, 2000). Families 
may choose to participate in the subsidy program due to unobservable characteristics that will 
bias results when estimating the impact of subsidy receipt, even with controls for observable 
factors related to selection. Our goal is to estimate the effect of subsidy receipt, S, for a child i on 
outcome Y, controlling for child and family characteristics that might affect selection and 
outcomes, Xi. The estimated coefficient indicating the effect of subsidy receipt, γ, may be biased 
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because of the relationship between factors we do not observe, which remain in the error term, εi, 
and the included covariates (see equation 1). 
Yi = β0 + γSi +βXi + εi        (1)  
However, these unobservables may be constant over time. So if we observe children at 
multiple points in time, we can estimate a model that includes a “fixed effect,” αi, for each child, 
which does not vary over time. This fixed effect will capture families’ unchanging unobservable 
differences, such as any time-invariant parental preferences for certain types of care, which may 
cause parents to both take up subsidy and select that type of care. While parental preferences 
may shift over time due to factors such as children aging, changing work, or new care options 
becoming available, these changes can be incorporated into the model. If there are any 
unobservable changes over time that affect both subsidy take up and outcomes, the model will 
still potentially be biased. However, if the model is correct, after including the fixed effect and 
observable factors that vary over time, Xit, the estimated coefficient on the subsidy indicator, γ, 
can be interpreted causally as an unbiased estimate of the direct impact of subsidy receipt on the 
outcome Yit (see equation 2) (Burchinal & Nelson, 2000).  
Yit = β0 + γSit +βXit + αi + εit        (2) 
This approach to addressing selection is sometimes referred to as a “within” model, as in a 
within-child (and over time) comparison. Because of its substantial data requirements (multiple 
time points for the same child) it is not frequently used in examining child outcomes. When 
feasible, the fixed effects model has the advantage of controlling for fixed unobservable factors, 
over methods that rely on observable variables only for controls or matching. However, if there 
remain time-varying unobserved factors driving families’ decision making, only some biases will 
be removed by this method while others will persist. Fixed effects methods have been used in 
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assessing the impact of child care choices in other settings, for instance in examining the 
relationship between multiple child care arrangements and children’s behavior (Morrissey, 2009) 
or the effect of income on child development (Blau, 1999). The main downside of using fixed 
effect methods is likely to be reduction in the power to test hypotheses and larger standard errors 
(Burchinal & Nelson, 2000). Fortunately, in our results below, we have sufficiently precise 
estimates to test our hypotheses of interest about the impacts of subsidy receipt.  
Fixed effects models were estimated for each of three different outcome measures: 1) a 
binary variable for change in primary provider between survey waves; 2) number of concurrent 
arrangements (multiplicity); and 3) perceived quality, as quantified by the factor analysis 
described above. We estimated fixed effects ordinary least squares (OLS) models for the quality 
factor and for the number of providers, and all children observed in at least two survey waves 
were included in the analysis. The results for number of providers were not substantively 
different when a fixed effects count (Poisson) model was estimated instead of OLS. 
The model for child care stability is slightly more complex, as stability is measured as a 
change in provider between survey waves. The outcome of interest is the probability of a change 
in primary provider for child i between time t (referred to as the initial survey wave) and time 
t+1 (the subsequent wave). In equation 3 this outcome is denoted as ΔPit+1. Note that the initial 
wave is not the same as the baseline of the survey; the initial wave could be wave 4 and the 
subsequent wave would be wave 5. A number of characteristics, Xit, as measured in initial time t, 
may affect the likelihood of changing child care, such as whether there are other children in the 
family. Subsidy receipt, Sit, is also measured in the initial period. In this case, γ is an estimate of 
the impact of having subsidy at one point in time on the probability of subsequently changing 
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care. Changes in the family’s circumstances between time t and t+1 may also affect whether the 
child changes care. We denote these changes, such as the birth of a new child, as ΔZit+1.   
Probability(ΔPit+1)= β0 + γSit +βXit +δΔZit+1 + αi + εit   (3) 
For the model of child care stability, the sample includes all children observed with at least 
two potential changes—so children observed in at least three survey waves. Because five waves 
is the maximum observed, the maximum number of potential changes observed for a child is four. 
To estimate models for the probability of changing primary provider, we use a fixed effects 
linear probability model, which applies ordinary least squares (OLS) to the binary outcome. Our 
findings were not substantively different when a conditional logit fixed effects model was used 
instead.  
One of the disadvantages of the fixed effects model is that it can only estimate coefficients 
for characteristics that vary over time. Anything that is inherently constant (such as ethnicity or 
race) is necessarily absorbed into the fixed effects. This is a major disadvantage if one wants to 
estimate the impact of constant characteristics on an outcome. However, since our goal is to test 
the impact of subsidy receipt (which does change over time) on various outcomes, having the 
effects of characteristics that do not vary over time absorbed into the fixed effects is not a 
problem; it should just be kept in mind that additional constant characteristics (such as child 
gender), are effectively included within the child fixed effects (and therefore do not have a 
separate estimated parameter). A related model to the fixed effects model is the “random effects” 
model, which has the advantage of allowing for the estimation of all coefficients. However, it 
essentially assumes that the differences (“effects”) for each child are randomly distributed and in 
no way related to the observed covariates, an unlikely assumption in this case.  
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Covariates  
In each of the fixed effects models, we control for a number of time-varying child and 
family characteristics noted in the literature to be related to parents’ child care decisions 
(Chaudry et al., 2011). These factors include the composition of the household, namely whether 
the parent is single, the number of other adults in the household, the number of children under 
age 6, and the number of children age 6 to 12 years (Tang, Coley, & Votruba-Drzal, 2012). The 
age of the focal child (categorized as infant, toddler, preschool age, and school age), is also 
expected to influence child care decisions (Coley, Votruba-Drzal, Collins, & Miller, 2014). 
Family economic circumstances are likely to influence child care decisions by affecting resource 
constraints and need for care (Burstein & Layzer, 2007; Chaudry et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2012). 
We include whether the parent is employed full-time, part-time or not employed. We also 
incorporate measures of whether the parent is engaged in education or training activities, along 
with a categorical income variable and a welfare receipt variable. Another important constraint 
on care choices that we include in our models is whether a family member or friend is available 
to care for the child regularly (Davis, Carlin, et al., 2014; Davis & Connelly, 2005). For the 
models of the multiplicity and perceived quality outcomes, these covariates were measured 
contemporaneously, that is, in the same survey wave as the outcome variable. For the model of 
the probability of changing providers, these covariates were measured in the initial wave. 
Additional variables in the stability models include measures of whether the family moved or 
had a new baby between the survey waves. These changes in family circumstances were 
expected to increase the likelihood of changing providers (Davis, Carlin, et al., 2014). 
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Sample Descriptives 
Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics of the sample at baseline (N=323) and pooled 
over waves (N=1,133) in order to provide a comparison of the families in this study with the full 
sample (before attrition). In the appendix we present the sample characteristics at each wave for 
each of our analysis samples, which vary across outcomes and methods. At baseline, the 323 
children in the sample were primarily in FFN care (45%), followed by center care (31%), 
parental care only (12%) and FCC care (12%). Children were almost evenly split by gender 
(51% female). By design the children were under age six, and at baseline, 31% were infants 
(under 16 months), 28% toddlers (17-32 months) and 36% were preschool aged (33 months and 
above, not yet in school). A small percentage (5%) were school-aged by the time of the first 
interview. The majority of children were non-white, non-Hispanic (58%), while 29% were white 
and 13% Hispanic. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of children lived in single parent households. Close 
to 40% of the parents responding to the baseline survey had at least some college education 
while a quarter (26%) had not completed high school. Nearly 60% were not employed at the time 
of the baseline survey and 71% reported receiving welfare (TANF). 
The pooled data demonstrate that, despite attrition, the characteristics of the pooled sample 
are similar to the baseline sample. Specifically, there is little variation between time-invariant 
characteristics such as child sex, child race, and respondent education between the baseline and 
pooled samples. For instance, while 29% of the baseline sample is White, non-Hispanic, 30% of 
the pooled sample is White, non-Hispanic. The share Hispanic shifts from 13% to 11% and the 
share non-white, non-Hispanic from 58% to 59%. We would expect a number of other 
characteristics to naturally change over time, such as incomes shifting since we targeted a low-
income sample initially and would expect some families to move to higher income brackets. 
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However, patterns remain similar here as well across the baseline and pooled samples, with 53% 
of families having household income below $15,000 in the baseline and 50% in the pooled 
sample. By far the largest differences between the baseline and pooled samples are children’s 
ages, which is natural as children age across waves, as well as some shifts into centers that are 
likely linked to child aging and development (Ansari & Winsler, 2013; Morrissey, 2010).     
In order to estimate the child fixed effects model, we need to observe the same children 
both when they are receiving and are not receiving subsidy. A sizeable share of children in the 
survey sample were receiving child care subsidies in each wave, based on the administrative data. 
Pooled across survey waves (N=1,133), 39% of children received subsidy on average. Looking at 
the survey waves individually, the percentage of children who received subsidy at the time of the 
survey in Wave 1 (N=323) was 37.5%, in Wave 2 (N=250) was 39.6%, in Wave 3 (N=218) was 
42.2%, in Wave 4 (N=196) was 38.8%, and in Wave 5 (N=146) was 33.6%.  
While the percentage of children receiving subsidies ranged only between 34% and 42% 
across the survey waves, this consistency masks a great deal of movement into and out of the 
subsidy program across the waves. Among the children who were present in all five survey 
waves, 17% received subsidies at the time of all five waves and 36% did so at none of the waves. 
The remaining 47% received subsidies at some but not all waves. Table 3 shows the percentage 
of children who exited subsidy and the percentage that began receiving subsidy between survey 
waves. Between 22% and 32% of children receiving subsidies at one wave then exited the 
subsidy program at some point over the approximately six months until the next wave, with an 
average of 26% in the pooled sample exiting subsidy. The average rate of entering the subsidy 
program was 16% in the pooled sample. From Wave 1 to Wave 2, 21% of children not receiving 
subsidy in Wave 1 were receiving subsidy by Wave 2. Fewer children entered (or re-entered) the 
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subsidy program in later survey waves, likely due to children’s changing care needs and options 
as they got older. By Wave 4, none of the children in the longitudinal sample were infants (under 
16 months) and only a quarter were toddlers (17-32 months); most were preschool or school 
aged and may have had different care needs or other options such as Head Start. 
The instability of subsidy receipt observed in the survey sample is not surprising, given 
the relatively short spells of subsidy participation found in most states (Davis, Krafft, et al., 
2014; Swenson, 2014). In Minnesota, an analysis of all children receiving subsidies estimated the 
median length of a subsidized arrangement to be six months, with a 25th percentile of three 
months and a 75th percentile of 12 months for a similar time period (Davis, Krafft, et al., 2014). 
Using the administrative data for the survey sample, we find that the survey sample had a similar 
pattern to all Minnesota subsidy recipients: a 25th percentile of three months, a median of six 
months, and a 75th percentile of 11 months for the length of time spent on subsidy and with a 
particular provider. The similarity between our sample of recipients and all recipients suggests 
our results are representative of subsidy recipients in Minnesota.  
Results 
For each of the outcomes of interest (stability, number of providers and quality of care) 
we present the results first in a simple descriptive framework comparing those receiving child 
care subsidies to those not receiving subsidies, and then present the results of the child fixed 
effects models.  
Patterns of Instability: Probability of Ending an Arrangement between Survey Waves 
Looking first at the results on child care instability patterns, Table 4 presents the 
percentage of children who changed primary provider and the percentage of children who had a 
change in any provider by initial subsidy status (measured at the first of two consecutive survey 
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waves). Not only did half of children experience a change in their primary provider, but three-
quarters experienced at least one change in their care arrangements between the waves. Children 
who received subsidies in an initial wave were less likely to change primary provider by the 
subsequent wave than children who did not receive a subsidy. Children who moved from or to 
parent care only were included in the count of changes in primary provider (they started or ended 
a non-parental care arrangement). Previous research suggests that children in parental care only 
have a high chance of care changes between waves (Davis, Carlin, et al., 2014; Krafft et al., 
2013). When those in parental care only were excluded (from the unsubsidized care group), rates 
were very similar to those presented for unsubsidized children overall. While 59% of 
unsubsidized children in the pooled sample changed primary providers between waves, only 
41% of subsidized children did so. There was less difference between subsidized and 
unsubsidized children in terms of the percentage who changed any provider. For both groups, 
about three-quarters experienced a change in any provider.  
It is also possible for children to remain with the same provider when they stop receiving 
subsidies, or to have a previously unsubsidized provider who becomes subsidized. Given the 
relatively small sample size for individuals entering or exiting subsidy in each wave, we present 
only the pooled percentages of individuals across survey waves. Among those who exited 
subsidy between waves (N=83), 66% changed primary provider and 82% changed at least one 
provider. Compared to the rates for unsubsidized children, this rate of changing primary 
providers was around 7 percentage points higher and the rate of changing at least one provider 
was 5 percentage points higher. Families may change providers when they exit the subsidy 
program, or their circumstances may have changed in a way that required both exit from the 
subsidy program and a change in provider.  
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Those entering the subsidy program also had high rates of changes in care. However, these 
changes may represent families switching to a preferred type of care. Among those who entered 
subsidy (N=74) between one wave and the next, 77% changed primary providers and 92% 
changed at least one provider. Table 5 suggests that the parents entering and exiting subsidy were 
often making more changes in their type of care (compared to those whose subsidy status did not 
change between waves). Those entering the subsidy program tended to move from less formal 
care, such as FFN care, to more formal care, such as centers (62% of those initially in FFN care 
made a transition to centers). Those exiting the subsidy program moved to less formal care. 
Among those who were in centers when receiving subsidy, 37% moved to FFN care and 17% to 
parental care when they lost subsidy. Only 44% remained in center care. Whether we looked at 
those receiving subsidies compared to those not, or at changes in care arrangements when 
entering or exiting subsidy, there were clearly different patterns of child care usage and slightly 
more stability of care when children were in subsidized care.  
Fixed Effects Model of Change in Primary Provider 
 Although the patterns described above suggest that subsidy receipt is related to slightly 
higher rates of stability (fewer changes in primary provider), this result does not control for 
families’ selection into the subsidy program. Therefore, we turn to the child fixed effects models 
to rigorously measure the impact of receiving a subsidy on the probability of changing primary 
provider (Table 6). Given that most children changed at least one of their providers between 
survey waves, we focus on stability of primary provider. The sample for this model was 217 
children with 745 observations across waves. In the child fixed effects model, we find that 
stability was neither improved nor worsened by subsidy receipt; the estimated parameter for 
subsidy receipt was not a statistically significant predictor of changing primary provider. 
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Additionally, the estimated change in probability was small, a decrease of just 1.6 percentage 
points in the probability of changing primary provider. We tested the sensitivity of our finding to 
removing observations where the child was initially in parental care only, since those who were 
in parental care had very high likelihood of changing care (i.e., starting to use non-parental care). 
The sample for this model was 196 children with 628 observations. The estimated coefficient on 
subsidy receipt increased in (absolute) size but remained statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that subsidy receipt reduced the probability of changing primary provider by 4.6 percentage 
points. From the results of the child fixed effects model, overall we conclude that stability of care 
was neither increased nor decreased when families received child care subsidies.  
While instability was not related to subsidy receipt, overall there was a high level of 
instability of child care arrangements found for this sample of children from low-income families. 
Why do families change their arrangements so frequently? The other covariates in the fixed 
effects regression suggest some of the factors that drive instability. Factors including the number 
of children, type of care and care availability, as well as family changes such as moving or 
having a new baby were significantly related to changing primary provider. Parents’ survey 
responses also provide some insight into why child care changes occurred. Most of the responses 
revolved around practicalities, changes in care needs and family circumstances, including issues 
such as cost, location, and hours, the care no longer being available, losing a job or moving, a 
new caregiver (such as a grandparent) becoming available, or children becoming school age. 
Responses did occasionally relate to child care funding, such as “I lost my child care financing,” 
“MFIP [welfare] ended and lost child care coverage,” or “Childcare assistance cut me off,” but 
these were relatively infrequent, at most a few individuals at each wave of the survey. Of the 271 
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responses to the question asking why families changed their arrangements, just seven responses 
(2.6%) related to losing a child care subsidy.  
Patterns of Number of Care Arrangements  
Next we examine the relationship between number of concurrent providers and subsidy 
receipt. Table 7 presents the number of providers for subsidized and unsubsidized children, as 
well as the number of subsidized providers for subsidy recipients (based on the administrative 
data). Multiple arrangements were extremely common for children in this low-income sample. 
Subsidy recipients tended to have similar numbers of providers overall compared to those not 
receiving subsidy who were using non-parental care (Table 7). In the pooled sample, both groups 
averaged 1.8 providers. Although children receiving subsidy had very similar numbers of 
providers compared to children not receiving subsidy, only some of those providers were 
subsidized. While the number of providers for subsidy recipients in the pooled sample was 1.8, 
the number of subsidized providers (identified using the subsidy administrative data) was only 
1.1. While the subsidy program was supporting at least one provider for subsidy recipients, 
around half of subsidy recipients had an additional, unsubsidized arrangement.  
Table 8 presents the patterns of number of arrangements across types of care, as well as 
in non-parental care overall, by subsidy receipt, pooling all the waves. Across all the waves, 43% 
of children were in center care, 35% were using in-home care, and 39% were in out-of-home 
care, with some children in multiple types of care. There was an average of 14% of children with 
no regular non-parental care (parental care only). Comparing subsidy recipients and non-
recipients, those receiving subsidy were much more likely to be using center care (68% of 
subsidy recipients, 28% of non-recipients), slightly less likely to be using in-home care (29% of 
subsidy recipients, 38% of non-recipients), and equally likely to be in out-of-home care. While 
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3% of subsidy recipients reported using parental care only (probably due to the slightly different 
time frames for the survey (two weeks) and administrative data (one calendar month), 21% of 
non-recipients were in parental care only. Although subsidy recipients and non-recipients used 
somewhat different types of care, they were very similar in the number of providers they used 
when they used a particular care type. Specifically, both subsidy recipients and non-recipients 
used about 1.5 in-home providers and about 1.4 to 1.5 out-of-home providers when they used 
these types of care (Table 8).  
Fixed Effects Model of the Number of Providers 
 Table 9 presents the estimation results for the OLS child fixed effects model where the 
dependent variable is the number of providers concurrently caring for the child on a regular basis. 
The sample for this model was 239 children with 898 observations. The results show that subsidy 
receipt was not related to the number of providers families used for the focal child: the estimated 
coefficient indicates those receiving subsidy used 0.032 fewer providers, and was not statistically 
significant. Only one estimated coefficient was significant in the model, which suggests families 
use multiple providers for reasons that do not change substantially over time. After controlling 
for unobserved characteristics of children in the fixed effects model, there was no evidence that 
subsidy receipt changed the number of providers used concurrently.   
Why do families use these multiple arrangements? The survey asked parents who used 
multiple types of child care why they did so as an open ended question. By far the most common 
responses related to the availability of care, such as centers not being open evenings or weekends, 
or Head Start not covering all the hours of care needed. These responses suggest that in some 
cases multiple arrangements were not desired, but were necessary to meet care needs. In other 
cases, however, multiple child care arrangements were due to parents’ preferences. For instance, 
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“so she can spend time with her grandparents” was one response, along with “to interact/play 
with other kids.” Using multiple arrangements may be due to parental preferences for diverse 
experiences rather than availability or affordability constraints in some cases, and does not seem 
to be related to subsidy receipt.  
Patterns of Perceived Quality of Care 
In this section we examine the relationship between the quality factor and receiving a child 
care subsidy. Table 10 presents the mean value of the quality factor by subsidy status and also by 
type of care at each wave, for the primary child care arrangement of those in non-parental care. 
The units on the quality factor are standard deviations, and the variable, by construction, has an 
overall mean of zero. Looking across all the waves, children receiving subsidies have a 0.3 
standard deviation (SD) quality factor, while unsubsidized children have a  -0.2 SD quality factor. 
Thus children receiving subsidies were in primary arrangements where the quality factor was 
higher by approximately half a standard deviation. The exact difference varied across the waves, 
but this pattern held in all the waves.  
Differences in the mean factor for subsidized versus unsubsidized children varied across 
the types of care. The average quality factor for children whose primary provider was a center 
was the same for both subsidized and unsubsidized children (about 0.6). Subsidized children in 
family child care have a slightly higher average value of the quality factor, by 0.1 SD, compared 
to unsubsidized children. Those children receiving subsidies and in family, friend or neighbor 
care reported slightly higher quality than those not receiving subsidies, -0.4 versus -0.6.  
Fixed Effects Model for Perceived Quality of Care 
Although the average quality factor was higher for children receiving subsidies than for 
non-recipients, this comparison does not control for observed and unobserved characteristics of 
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the children and families. Table 11 presents fixed effects OLS regressions for the quality factor. 
The sample for this model was 205 children and 703 observations. In the first column, which 
does not include controls for type of care, subsidy receipt predicted a significantly higher level of 
the quality factor, by 0.54 standard deviations. Most of this effect was mediated through 
increased access to centers, as seen in the second column. Other types of care have significantly 
lower quality factors than centers, particularly family, friend, or neighbor care. The effect of 
subsidy receipt itself remains significant in the model including type of care controls, a 0.15 SD 
increase in perceived quality. The results demonstrate a direct effect of subsidy receipt on the 
quality factor in addition to the effect mediated through selecting centers rather than other types 
of care.  
Because the quality factor is a construct based on a number of different questions, we tested 
the sensitivity of our findings to different specifications of the factor. Specifically, we tested 
alternative subsets of the 17 questions asked about the care setting and the child’s experience. 
First we estimated the model using a factor based on only responses to the questions on the 
child’s experience (items a-g in Table 1), as these questions may be less dependent on a 
particular type of care setting. We also tested a factor with items a-g (child’s experience) and h, j, 
and k (talking with the provider, having books and learning materials, and a warm and caring 
environment) based on a similar principle. With both of these alternative specifications, we see a 
positive and significant effect of subsidy receipt on perceived quality before types of care are 
added, and a positive but insignificant effect of subsidy once the differences mediated through 
use of centers are controlled for by adding type of care. The effect sizes are, unsurprisingly, 
smaller, since with fewer variables the underlying construct is measured less precisely. However, 
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the overall result of a positive impact from subsidy, mediated through parents selecting centers 
when financially supported by a subsidy, remains.  
Discussion  
Changes to CCDF as part of the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 2014 
emphasize the importance of child care quality and stability of care (Matthews, Schulman, 
Vogtman, Johnson-Staub, & Blank, 2015). Whether subsidies support stability and quality is 
therefore an important question to researchers and policymakers. In this study we found that 
participation in the child care subsidy program did not impact the stability of care or change the 
number of concurrent providers for low-income families in Minnesota. Subsidy receipt did lead 
to a higher reported quality of care. Low-income parents, when given additional financial 
resources, were more likely to use center-based care and they reported higher quality (in both 
center and family child care) based on a number of structural and process dimensions of quality.  
There is an important avenue for future research in understanding why subsidy 
participation—despite providing additional financial resources to the family—does not appear to 
contribute to stability in care arrangements. While median durations of subsidized arrangements 
were short (6 months), subsidy recipients were not more likely to change care; rather, low-
income children typically had short arrangements and high rates of instability, regardless of 
subsidy receipt. The result that subsidy receipt had essentially no effect on the subsequent 
stability of care could be the net effect of elements of the subsidy program that could increase 
stability and other elements of the program that could decrease stability. The added financial 
resources of subsidy receipt as an ongoing source of support to pay for child care could lead 
parents to choose arrangements with greater stability. At the same time, policy or administrative 
barriers that lead to the loss of subsidy could decrease the subsequent stability of care. For 
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instance, income eligibility limits may result in families losing subsidies temporarily, if income 
fluctuates (Adams & Rohacek, 2010).  
Another aspect of subsidy policy that may influence the stability of care arrangements is 
the requirement to re-certify eligibility at frequent intervals, which may act as an administrative 
barrier to continuity of subsidy and thus affect the continuity of care (Adams & Rohacek, 2010). 
Multiple studies have found that children were more likely to exit subsidy when they had to 
recertify their eligibility (Davis et al., 2016; Grobe et al., 2008; Ha & Meyer, 2010; 
Michalopoulos et al., 2010; Weber et al., 2014). Policies such as lengthening eligibility periods 
therefore may help subsidy increase the stability of care. Redesigning eligibility policies so that 
parents can remain eligible to receive subsidy during temporary income, employment, or family 
changes may also improve stability. While the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 
2014 makes some changes such as 12-month eligibility periods and allowing for temporary 
employment or income fluctuations, it may also be that child care stability is difficult to promote 
through subsidy policy. Parents rarely attributed child care changes to financial issues, thus there 
may be a limited scope for subsidy to increase stability by improving financing for child care. 
Other studies have found that the reasons respondents give for changing care and the predictors 
of care changes are multi-faceted and complex (Chaudry, 2004; Davis, Carlin, et al., 2014; Henly 
et al., 2015). 
These findings confirm earlier work (Davis, Carlin, et al., 2014), which demonstrated, 
albeit without the benefit of fixed effects methods to correct for selection, that those who initially 
were receiving a subsidy were no more or less likely to change primary providers. The previous 
study found that those receiving a subsidy were less likely to change type of care; this may be 
related to our finding that parents are more likely to choose centers when subsidized if parents 
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are better able to access preferred care arrangements with a subsidy. However, receipt of a 
subsidy does not appear to be funding or fully meeting all of children’s child care needs. Use of 
multiple arrangements was common for both children who did and did not receive subsidies. Not 
all use of multiple providers is necessarily problematic; parents also may want to expose their 
children to a variety of care and education environments (Speirs, Vesely, & Roy, 2015).  
Previous research indicates that parents may not be able to identify subtle differences in 
process quality or may overestimate quality when compared to expert observers’ assessments 
(Cryer, Tietze, & Wessels, 2002; Mocan, 2007). Yet, in this study, parents discerned features of 
care that are known to be associated with quality and children’s outcomes and that also vary by 
type of care (Li-Grining & Coley, 2006; NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, 2004). 
When asked a series of questions on the characteristics of care, parents’ responses over time 
varied by type of child care setting, suggesting that parents were able to distinguish whether 
children were experiencing particular elements of quality care. Though the distinctions aligned 
with features of care expected in high quality settings, it is important to note that this finding 
does not imply that children in this study were experiencing excellent care. Though observations 
were not available in this study, an evaluation of early care and education program quality in 
Minnesota (Tout et al., 2016) and analyses of national data (e.g. Abner, Gordon, Kaestner, & 
Korenman, 2013) indicate that average scores on observed quality across child care centers and 
family child care programs are in the middle- to low-range. A recent synthesis of research on 
public pre-kindergarten concludes that excellent quality is available in a small percentage of 
settings and that instructional quality is of particular concern (Yoshikawa et al., 2013).  
The results also indicate that in the absence of a subsidy, cost constrains parents’ choices 
to lower-quality options. Subsidy receipt decreased constraints, which led parents to select center 
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care for their children more often, and which drove much of the quality effect. Other research has 
found that parents perceive centers to be higher quality and that parents emphasizing care quality 
or learning as their priority are more likely to choose centers (Coley et al., 2014; Kim & Fram, 
2009). There was also an increase in the quality factor when receiving subsidies after controlling 
for type of care, indicating that even within care types, subsidy receipt allows parents to select 
higher quality of care. Overall, subsidy receipt had a sizeable impact on elements of the quality 
of care children experience, in part by allowing families to access and select higher quality types 
of care. While studies have demonstrated that low income families may be constrained in 
choosing higher quality providers (Fuller, Kagan, Caspary, & Gauthier, 2002; Shlay, Tran, 
Weinraub, & Harmon, 2005) our results suggest that families did have higher perceived quality 
options to switch to when receiving a subsidy. 
Study Strengths and Limitations  
A particularly valuable element of this study is the use of longitudinal data on children 
and families and the findings’ robustness to selection and unobservable characteristics of 
children and families. When examining the same families making decisions over time, using 
child fixed effects removes the problem of selection on any unobservable characteristics that do 
not change over time, and therefore accounts for any time-invariant aspects of preferences for 
certain characteristics of care. While decisions and preferences may evolve in response to child 
age, work, or other care alternatives being available, we control for these important time-varying 
characteristics. The main limitation of the approach is that if there are unobserved characteristics 
that vary over time and are related to both subsidy receipt and the outcomes, the results can still 
be biased. So, for instance, if parental preferences are changing over time in unobservable ways 
that affect both subsidy receipt and the outcomes, this may bias results. An interesting area for 
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future research is investigating how and how much parental preferences evolve over time, as 
well as why they change. 
An important limitation of this research is that we were unable to obtain observational 
measures of quality of care arrangements. The quality factor used as an outcome measure in this 
study was based on parent reports. Fortunately, the level of detail in the questions about the focal 
child’s care arrangements reflected elements of quality included in Minnesota’s QRIS and 
allowed us to identify key elements of the care setting that are likely to be related to 
observational quality measures (Hestenes et al., 2015; Tout et al., 2016). The modest sample size 
and attrition across waves of the survey are also limitations, although the relative consistency of 
time-invariant characteristics between the baseline and pooled samples suggests any attrition bias 
is likely to be small. We have data from only one state, and parent preferences about care and 
take-up of subsidy may differ from states with different policy and economic environments. 
Nonetheless, our key results concur with those of Ryan et al. (2011) and Johnson et al. (2012) 
who find that subsidy recipients in a nationally representative sample used higher quality care 
because they were more likely to use center-based care.  
This paper focused on the care arrangements subsidized through CCDF vouchers. We 
were unable to explicitly examine additional or alternative forms of care, such as public pre-
kindergarten or Head Start programs, which other studies have found to have differential effects 
on children’s development (Currie & Neidell, 2007; Forry, Davis, & Welti, 2013). Johnson, 
Ryan and Brooks-Gunn (2012) find that children who are in Head Start or public pre-
kindergarten experience higher quality care than children who received child care subsidies. 
Other research has argued that children’s development or health may be harmed when families 
receive child care subsidies, because of the use of low-quality care in place of parental care 
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(Herbst & Tekin, 2010, 2011, 2012). Although we are not comparing the quality of child care to 
the alternative of parental care only, the availability of subsidies provides parents who use non-
parental care the ability to select higher quality care by reducing their financial constraints.  
Another limitation of this study is that we do not directly test the relationship between 
subsidy participation and child development outcomes. While we find subsidy receipt leads to 
similar stability and use of higher quality care and we would therefore expect improvements in 
child development outcomes, this relationship cannot be directly tested with the available data. 
In other studies that estimate the impact of subsidy on children’s developmental outcomes, some 
negative effects of subsidy have been found, but the relationships observed could well be due to 
selection into the subsidy program (e.g., Hawkinson et al., 2013). An important direction for 
future research is therefore studies that focus directly on subsidy’s impact on child development, 
but fully account for selection, for example by using fixed effects models. 
Conclusion 
This paper examined whether the receipt of child care subsidies affects reported quality 
and stability of care, using longitudinal data on children from low-income families in Minnesota. 
Child fixed effects models were used to generate estimates of the impact of the subsidy program. 
Child care subsidies were shown to have no net effect on child care stability or the number of 
providers used; both instability and multiplicity are high for children in low-income families 
regardless of subsidy status. Children receiving child care subsidies did experience elements of 
higher quality care, primarily due to increased use of center care. These results indicate that the 
subsidy program may have some positive effects on child outcomes through its impact on quality 
of care used by low-income families.   
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Table 1. Distribution of responses to survey questions used in the quality factor analysis, factor loadings, uniqueness, and 
scoring coefficients 
 Distribution of Responses Factor Analysis 





Please think about when [child] is at [primary provider] and choose the 
answer that best represents the experience you believe [child] is having 
there: 
     
   
a. My child gets a lot of positive, individual attention 0.1 0.4 7.6 23.5 68.4 0.18 0.97 0.04 
b. My child likes the caregiver or provider 0.1 0.3 2.9 8.3 88.4 0.24 0.94 0.05 
c. There are lots of creative activities such as art, music, dance, 
and drama 2.2 3.3 16.5 15.5 62.5 0.62 0.61 0.13 
d. The caregiver provides activities that are right for my child and 
fit my child’s needs 0.8 0.6 7.1 15.4 76.1 0.56 0.69 0.13 
e. My child is learning new things and new skills 1.4 1.0 9.0 12.6 76.0 0.60 0.64 0.13 
f. My child gets a chance to run around and play outside 3.3 3.8 16.0 17.3 59.6 0.32 0.90 0.05 
g. My child watches television more than one hour each day 28.8 25.9 28.6 6.6 10.0 -0.19 0.96 -0.02 
How often would you say [primary provider] does each of these things:         
h. Talk with you? 0.8 0.6 6.7 10.0 81.8 0.14 0.98 0.03 
i. Use a curriculum or planning tool for teaching? 9.5 6.9 18.6 14.1 51.0 0.74 0.46 0.19 
j. Have a lot of books and learning materials?  2.3 1.7 6.9 12.6 76.6 0.56 0.69 0.10 
k. Provide a warm and caring environment with positive 
relationships between teachers and caregivers and children? 0.4 0.4 2.3 4.2 92.8 0.25 0.94 0.06 
l. Help your child get along with other children? 2.4 1.3 5.1 9.5 81.7 0.34 0.89 0.05 
m. Track your child’s learning and development using an 
assessment tool? 22.6 8.4 14.6 11.8 42.6 0.69 0.52 0.15 
n. Have teachers and caregivers with formal education and 
training to work with young children? 30.7 4.8 10.4 7.5 46.5 0.72 0.48 0.21 
o. Have staff that are warm and friendly with your child? 15.9 0.5 2.0 4.6 77.0 0.42 0.82 0.07 
p. Enroll children from different backgrounds, for example, race, 
ethnicity, and religion? 29.4 3.4 8.0 5.5 53.7 0.63 0.60 0.14 
q. Have caregivers or teachers who speak your family’s native 
language with your child? 7.4 0.5 3.6 2.8 85.8 0.18 0.97 0.03 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data. N (observations)=787 
Notes: Sample characteristics available in the appendix.  
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Table 2. Sample characteristics by subsidy status 
  Baseline Pooled 
Subsidy status: 
No 
subsidy Subsidy Total 
No 
Subsidy Subsidy Total 
Type of care 
      Center 17.8 53.7 31.3 22.3 64.3 38.5 
FCC 5.0 23.1 11.8 6.3 16.7 10.3 
FFN 59.4 19.8 44.6 49.9 16.0 36.8 
Parental care only 17.8 3.3 12.4 21.4 3.0 14.3 
Child sex 
      Female 52.5 48.8 51.1 50.4 49.7 50.1 
Male 47.5 51.2 48.9 49.6 50.3 49.9 
Child age 
      Infant 36.1 21.5 30.7 16.4 11.7 14.6 
Toddler 23.8 34.7 27.9 25.9 27.9 26.7 
Preschooler 33.7 40.5 36.2 46.4 51.7 48.5 
School age 6.4 3.3 5.3 11.4 8.7 10.3 
Child race 
      White, non-Hispanic 27.7 31.4 29.1 31.5 27.9 30.1 
Hispanic 14.4 10.7 13.0 13.5 6.6 10.9 
Non-white, non-Hispanic 57.9 57.9 57.9 55.0 65.4 59.0 
Single parent 57.9 73.6 63.8 51.1 76.2 60.8 
Resp. education 
      Less than high school 30.7 17.4 25.7 27.9 17.8 24.0 
High school 32.7 36.4 34.1 33.8 35.0 34.2 
Some college 33.7 39.7 35.9 35.1 39.8 36.9 
BA+ 3.0 6.6 4.3 3.3 7.3 4.9 
Resp. employment 
      None 66.8 43.0 57.9 51.2 33.2 44.2 
Part-time 14.9 23.1 18.0 15.4 17.2 16.1 
Full-time 18.3 33.9 24.1 33.4 49.7 39.7 
Resp. in education/training 21.8 28.1 24.1 18.0 24.5 20.5 
Household income 
      Under $15,000 59.9 42.1 53.3 51.1 49.2 50.4 
$15,000-$29,999 27.7 45.5 34.4 31.6 36.2 33.4 
$30,000+ 12.4 12.4 12.4 17.2 14.6 16.2 
Welfare 73.8 66.9 71.2 54.6 59.0 56.3 
Family or friend available to 
care for child 67.8 30.6 53.9 64.0 38.9 54.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Means             
Number of other adults 0.83 0.62 0.75 0.81 0.57 0.72 
Number of children under six 1.42 1.52 1.46 1.42 1.39 1.41 
Number of children 6-12 0.36 0.42 0.38 0.50 0.45 0.48 
N (observations)  202 121 323 696 437 1133 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics) and administrative 























Wave 1 to 2 31.6 21.1 98 152 
Wave 2 to 3 24.7 19.8 89 121 
Wave 3 to 4 21.8 12.7 78 110 
Wave 4 to 5 24.6 5.9 57 85 
Pooled 26.1 16.0 322 468 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota administrative data 
Notes: Initial subsidy receipt refers to subsidy receipt during the first of the two waves referred 
to in each row. 
Sample characteristics available in the appendix.  
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Table 4. Percentage of children with changes in primary and any provider by wave by 
subsidy status in initial wave 
 











who changed:       
Wave 1 to 2 62.5 46.9 56.4 82.9 75.5 80.0 
Wave 2 to 3 60.3 40.9 52.2 79.3 74.2 77.1 
Wave 3 to 4 52.3 38.5 46.5 68.2 74.4 70.7 
Wave 4 to 5 58.8 36.8 50.0 76.5 71.9 74.7 
Pooled 58.9 41.4 51.8 77.3 74.2 76.1 
Number of 
observations:       
Wave 1 to 2 152 98 250 152 98 250 
Wave 2 to 3 121 88 209 121 89 210 
Wave 3 to 4 109 78 187 110 78 188 
Wave 4 to 5 85 57 142 85 57 142 
Pooled 467 321 788 468 322 790 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (provider changes) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
Note: Initial subsidy receipt refers to subsidy receipt during the first of the two waves referred to 
in each row.  




Table 5. Type of care (percentages) (1) before subsidy and once receiving subsidy, children 
entering subsidy between waves and (2) while receiving subsidy and after subsidy, children 
exiting subsidy between waves 
 (1) Children entering subsidy between waves  
  Once receiving subsidy   




Center 86.7 6.7 6.7 0.0 100.0 15 
FCC 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 3 
FFN 61.5 7.7 20.5 10.3 100.0 39 
Parental 82.4 11.8 0.0 5.9 100.0 17 
Total 70.3 10.8 12.2 6.8 100.0 74 
(2) Children exiting subsidy between waves 
  After subsidy   




Center 44.2 1.9 36.5 17.3 100.0 52 
FCC 10.0 50.0 10.0 30.0 100.0 10 
FFN 11.1 0.0 72.2 16.7 100.0 18 
Parental 0.0 0.0 66.7 33.3 100.0 3 
Total 31.3 7.2 42.2 19.3 100.0 83 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics) and administrative 
data (subsidy status) 
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	Subsidy receipt -0.016 -0.046 
 
(0.069) (0.075) 
Type of care (center omitted) 
  Family child care 0.193+ 0.165 
 
(0.107) (0.123) 
Family/friend/neighbor 0.207** 0.204** 
 
(0.065) (0.069) 




 Child age (infant omitted) 
 Toddler 0.002 0.031 
 
(0.069) (0.077) 
Preschooler 0.041 0.034 
 
(0.101) (0.110) 
School age -0.048 -0.098 
 
(0.153) (0.173) 
Single parent -0.071 -0.068 
 
(0.084) (0.092) 
Number of other adults 0.004 -0.010 
 
(0.042) (0.047) 
Number of children under six 0.081 0.124 
 
(0.083) (0.086) 
Number of children 6-12 0.133+ 0.151 
 
(0.081) (0.095) 
Resp. employment (none omitted) 
Part time 0.036 0.036 
 
(0.069) (0.076) 
Full time -0.081 -0.093 
 
(0.067) (0.070) 
Resp. in education/training -0.001 0.044 
 
(0.059) (0.060) 
Welfare 0.023 -0.005 
 
(0.057) (0.065) 
Income (<$15000 omitted) 
  $15000-29999 0.017 0.028 
 
(0.053) (0.060) 




  Moved 0.112** 0.131** 
 
(0.042) (0.049) 
New baby 0.133 0.225* 
 
(0.091) (0.101) 
















Gained avail. 0.165** 0.214** 
 
(0.062) (0.069) 
Lost avail. 0.126+ 0.176* 
 
(0.069) (0.079) 
Constant 0.180 0.128 
 
(0.198) (0.202) 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 
N (observations) 745 628 
N (children) 217 196 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
Notes: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
In this fixed-effect model, child and family characteristics that are constant over time (child 
gender, race, parent education, etc.) are controlled for by the child fixed effects. 
Sample characteristics available in the appendix.  
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Table 7. Number of providers by wave and subsidy status 


















and in non-parental 
care 
Wave 1 1.08 1.73 1.84 117 166 
Wave 2 1.07 1.72 1.70 96 111 
Wave 3 1.11 1.93 1.72 88 102 
Wave 4 1.07 1.66 1.89 74 91 
Wave 5 1.06 1.71 1.90 49 77 
Pooled 1.08 1.75 1.81 424 547 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (number of providers) and 
administrative data (subsidy status, number of subsidized providers) 
Notes: Individuals receiving subsidy in the calendar month but not using non-parental care are 
excluded. 
Sample characteristics available in the appendix.  
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Table 8. Care arrangements by subsidy receipt, pooled across waves 
   Not receiving subsidy 
  All children 
Subsidy 
recipients 





Percentage using type of care 
    Center 43.2 67.7 27.7 35.3 
In home 34.7 29.1 38.2 48.6 
Out of home 38.7 39.6 38.2 48.6 
Any non-parental care 85.7 97.0 78.6 100.0 
Parental care only 14.3 3.0 21.4 0.0 
Mean number of providers (conditional on 
using type of care) 
    Center 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
In home 1.48 1.49 1.47 1.47 
Out of home 1.45 1.43 1.47 1.47 
Any non-parental care 1.78 1.75 1.81 1.81 
N (observations) 1133 437 696 547 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (type of care, mean providers) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
Notes: Sample characteristics available in the appendix.  
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Table 9. Child fixed effects OLS regression for number of providers 
Subsidy receipt -0.032 
 
(0.094) 
Child age (infant omitted) 






School age -0.042 
 
(0.228) 
Single parent -0.005 
 
(0.140) 
Number of other adults -0.045 
 
(0.086) 
Number of children under six 0.015 
 
(0.119) 
Number of children 6-12 0.211+ 
 
(0.124) 
Resp. employment (none 
omitted) 
 Part time -0.116 
 
(0.111) 
Full time 0.174 
 
(0.118) 






Income (<$15000 omitted) 










  (0.271) 
Model p-value 0.610 
N (observations) 898 
N (children) 239 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
Notes: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
In this fixed-effect model, child and family characteristics that are constant over time (child 
gender, race, parent education, etc.) are controlled for by the child fixed effects. 
Sample characteristics available in the appendix.  
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Table 10. Child care quality factor and subsidy receipt by type of care and wave  
  Center Family child care 
Family, friend, or 
neighbor care All 
Wave 
No 
Subsidy Subsidy  Total 
No 
Subsidy Subsidy  Total 
No 
Subsidy Subsidy  Total 
No 
Subsidy Subsidy  Total 
1 0.40 0.72 0.59 -0.11 -0.08 -0.09 -0.63 -0.29 -0.57 -0.37 0.32 -0.12 
2 0.66 0.58 0.61 -0.36 -0.48 -0.43 -0.47 -0.40 -0.46 -0.18 0.30 0.02 
3 0.64 0.58 0.60 -0.18 0.38 0.18 -0.71 -0.47 -0.66 -0.19 0.39 0.09 
4 0.69 0.42 0.52 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.68 -0.82 -0.71 -0.17 0.16 -0.01 
5 0.54 0.75 0.66 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.65 -0.19 -0.60 -0.19 0.52 0.09 
 Pooled 0.58 0.60 0.59 -0.15 -0.03 -0.07 -0.62 -0.44 -0.59 -0.24 0.33 0.00 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (quality factor) and administrative 
data (subsidy status) 
Notes: Sample characteristics available in the appendix.  
 61 
Table 11. Child fixed effects OLS regression for quality factor 
  
Model 1 
Model 2:  
Type of care 
included 
Subsidy receipt 0.540*** 0.148* 
 
(0.087) (0.072) 
Child age (infant omitted) 
  Toddler 0.307* 0.185+ 
 
(0.119) (0.101) 
Preschooler 0.376* 0.161 
 
(0.173) (0.147) 
School age 0.184 0.186 
 
(0.239) (0.198) 
Single parent -0.002 -0.076 
 
(0.110) (0.098) 
Number of other adults -0.067 -0.064 
 
(0.049) (0.055) 
Number of children under six 0.149 0.135 
 
(0.126) (0.115) 
Number of children 6-12 0.005 0.080 
 
(0.136) (0.116) 
Resp. employment (none 
omitted) 
  Part time -0.046 -0.019 
 
(0.081) (0.073) 
Full time -0.005 -0.044 
 
(0.091) (0.073) 
Resp. in education/training 0.120 0.118 
 
(0.091) (0.075) 
Welfare 0.111 0.169** 
 
(0.073) (0.064) 
Income (<$15000 omitted) 
  $15000-29999 0.096 0.059 
 
(0.070) (0.061) 
$30000+ 0.108 0.093 
 
(0.118) (0.092) 
Family/friend available -0.117 0.045 
 
(0.095) (0.090) 
Type of care (center omitted) 










Constant -0.737** 0.043 
 
(0.282) (0.257) 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 
N (observations) 703 703 
N (children) 205 205 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
Notes: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Includes only children in non-parental care. 
In this fixed-effect model, child and family characteristics that are constant over time (child 
gender, race, parent education, etc.) are controlled for by the child fixed effects. 




Appendix: Additional Tables on Sample Characteristics for Analysis Samples 
Table 12. Sample of children in non-parental care with quality factor data (Table 1, Table 
10) 
  Baseline Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Subsidy Recipient 36.7 41.3 47.2 46.5 38.5 
Type of care 
    Center 34.8 44.5 53.4 52.8 49.6
FCC 11.0 7.7 8.7 6.9 10.3 
FFN 54.3 47.7 37.9 40.3 40.2 
Parental care only N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Child Sex 
     Female 51.9 49.7 48.4 48.6 47.0 
Male 48.1 50.3 51.6 51.4 53.0 
Child age 
     Infant 26.2 19.4 9.3 0.0 0.0
Toddler 31.9 25.8 24.2 26.4 17.1 
Preschooler 37.6 49.0 55.3 67.4 59.8 
School age 4.3 5.8 11.2 6.2 23.1 
Child race 
     White, non-Hispanic 28.1 29.0 32.3 28.5 29.1
Hispanic 13.8 9.0 9.9 9.7 6.8 
Non-White, non-Hispanic 58.1 61.9 57.8 61.8 64.1 
Single parent 68.1 64.5 61.5 59.7 69.2 
Resp. Education 
    Less than high school 26.2 22.6 19.9 23.6 18.8
High school 34.3 31.0 34.2 29.9 29.9 
Some college 36.2 40.0 39.8 40.3 46.2 
BA+ 3.3 6.5 6.2 6.2 5.1 
Resp. employment 
    None 58.6 42.2 31.7 35.4 25.6
Part-time 22.4 15.6 17.4 11.1 22.2 
Full-time 19.0 42.2 50.9 53.5 52.1 
Resp. in education/training 25.7 24.5 16.8 16.7 17.1 
Household income 
    Under $15,000 54.3 59.4 47.8 43.8 41.0 
$15,000-$29,999 34.3 25.2 35.4 41.0 30.8 
$30,000+ 11.4 15.5 16.8 15.3 28.2 
Welfare 73.3 65.2 54.0 43.1 37.6 
Family or friend available to care for 
child 58.1 60.6 57.1 50.7 56.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Means           
Number of other adults 0.72 0.74 0.65 0.69 0.57 
Number of children under six 1.44 1.34 1.36 1.39 1.32 
Number of children 6-12 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.61 
N (observations)  210 155 161 144 117 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
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Table 13. Sample of children observed at least two waves (Table 3, Table 4) 
  Baseline Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Subsidy Recipient 39.1 39.6 43.3 39.9 33.8 
Type of care 
    Center 32.0 37.6 45.5 43.1 41.5 
FCC 11.3 10.8 10.0 8.5 9.2 
FFN 44.1 34.4 32.1 34.0 35.2 
Parental care only 12.5 17.2 12.4 14.4 14.1 
Child Sex 
     Female 50.4 50.0 49.0 49.5 48.6 
Male 49.6 50.0 51.0 50.5 51.4 
Child age 
     Infant 29.3 19.2 8.6 0.0 0.0 
Toddler 28.1 28.4 28.1 28.7 18.3 
Preschooler 36.7 46.8 49.5 63.3 55.6 
School age 5.9 5.6 13.8 8.0 26.1 
Child race 
     White, non-Hispanic 30.5 30.4 31.0 30.3 31.0 
Hispanic 10.9 11.2 10.0 9.6 9.2 
Non-White, non-Hispanic 58.6 58.4 59.0 60.1 59.9 
Single parent 64.1 60.8 58.6 58.5 62.7 
Resp. Education 
    Less than high school 23.8 23.6 23.3 22.3 21.8 
High school 35.2 34.8 34.8 35.6 32.4 
Some college 36.3 36.8 36.2 36.7 40.8 
BA+ 4.7 4.8 5.7 5.3 4.9 
Resp. employment 
    None 56.2 45.8 35.9 36.2 31.0 
Part-time 18.8 14.1 16.3 12.8 20.4 
Full-time 25.0 40.2 47.8 51.1 48.6 
Resp. in education/training 23.4 23.6 16.2 17.6 18.3 
Household income 
    Under $15,000 51.6 57.2 49.5 46.3 37.3 
$15,000-$29,999 33.2 28.8 34.3 39.4 31.7 
$30,000+ 15.2 14.0 16.2 14.4 31.0 
Welfare 68.8 61.2 53.3 42.6 36.6 
Family or friend available to care for 
child 54.7 54.0 53.8 52.1 59.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Means           
Number of other adults 0.73 0.77 0.69 0.70 0.65 
Number of children under six 1.44 1.40 1.41 1.38 1.34 
Number of children 6-12 0.39 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.68 
N (observations)  256 250 210 188 142 
Notes: Includes baseline characteristics of the N=790 observations included in a pair of waves 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
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Table 14. Sample of children for provider change model, including all initial care types 
(Table 6, first column) 
 
  Baseline Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Subsidy Recipient 40.1 41.9 43.8 39.9 34.5 
Type of care 
    Center 33.2 39.5 45.2 43.7 42.4
FCC 12.4 11.2 10.1 8.7 8.6 
FFN 41.9 33.0 32.2 33.9 35.3 
Parental care only 12.4 16.3 12.5 13.7 13.7 
Child Sex 
     Female 49.8 49.3 48.6 49.2 48.9
Male 50.2 50.7 51.4 50.8 51.1 
Child age 
     Infant 30.0 19.1 8.7 0.0 0.0
Toddler 28.6 29.3 28.4 28.4 18.7 
Preschooler 35.5 46.0 49.0 63.4 55.4 
School age 6.0 5.6 13.9 8.2 25.9 
Child race 
     White, non-Hispanic 30.4 30.7 30.8 29.5 30.9
Hispanic 10.1 10.2 10.1 9.8 9.4 
Non-White, non-Hispanic 59.4 59.1 59.1 60.7 59.7 
Single parent 64.1 60.9 58.2 57.9 64.0 
Resp. Education 
    Less than high school 23.5 23.7 23.6 21.9 21.6
High school 34.6 34.4 34.6 35.5 32.4 
Some college 36.4 36.3 36.1 37.2 41.0 
BA+ 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.5 5.0 
Resp. employment 
    None 53.9 45.3 35.3 35.0 30.9
Part-time 20.3 14.5 16.4 13.1 20.1 
Full-time 25.8 40.2 48.3 51.9 48.9 
Resp. in education/training 24.4 22.3 16.3 16.9 18.7 
Household income 
    Under $15,000 50.7 57.7 50.0 46.4 37.4
$15,000-$29,999 33.2 27.9 33.7 38.8 31.7 
$30,000+ 16.1 14.4 16.3 14.8 30.9 
Welfare 67.7 59.5 53.4 42.1 36.0 
Family or friend available to care for 
child 52.1 52.1 53.8 53.0 59.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Means           
Number of other adults 0.71 0.74 0.69 0.70 0.64 
Number of children under six 1.41 1.39 1.41 1.37 1.34 
Number of children 6-12 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.68 
N (observations)  217 215 208 183 139 
 
Notes: Includes baseline characteristics of the N=745 observations included in a pair of waves 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
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Table 15. Sample of children for provider change model, excluding initial parental care 
only (Table 6, second column) 
 
  Baseline Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Subsidy Recipient 42.3 46.1 49.1 41.4 38.3 
Type of care 
    Center 35.2 42.2 49.1 46.5 45.8
FCC 13.8 13.3 10.5 10.2 10.0 
FFN 43.9 35.0 32.7 35.0 33.3 
Parental care only 7.1 9.4 7.6 8.3 10.8 
Child Sex 
     Female 48.5 46.7 48.5 47.8 50.8
Male 51.5 53.3 51.5 52.2 49.2 
Child age 
     Infant 30.1 19.4 9.4 0.0 0.0
Toddler 29.6 28.9 26.3 27.4 20.0 
Preschooler 35.7 47.2 52.0 65.0 54.2 
School age 4.6 4.4 12.3 7.6 25.8 
Child race 
     White, non-Hispanic 31.6 31.7 32.2 32.5 30.8
Hispanic 8.2 7.8 7.6 8.9 8.3 
Non-White, non-Hispanic 60.2 60.6 60.2 58.6 60.8 
Single parent 66.3 65.6 63.2 61.1 65.8 
Resp. Education 
    Less than high school 22.4 22.2 22.8 19.7 20.8
High school 33.7 33.9 31.0 35.7 31.7 
Some college 37.8 38.3 39.2 38.2 41.7 
BA+ 6.1 5.6 7.0 6.4 5.8 
Resp. employment 
    None 53.1 45.3 31.2 35.0 31.7
Part-time 20.4 12.3 17.1 10.8 15.8 
Full-time 26.5 42.5 51.8 54.1 52.5 
Resp. in education/training 25.0 23.9 18.1 17.8 20.8 
Household income 
    Under $15,000 50.0 58.9 48.5 45.2 33.3
$15,000-$29,999 33.7 26.1 33.3 40.1 33.3 
$30,000+ 16.3 15.0 18.1 14.6 33.3 
Welfare 67.3 60.0 53.8 42.0 34.2 
Family or friend available to care for 
child 52.6 54.4 52.6 51.6 59.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Means           
Number of other adults 0.69 0.73 0.67 0.69 0.61 
Number of children under six 1.38 1.32 1.36 1.36 1.33 
Number of children 6-12 0.32 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.64 
N (observations)  196 180 171 157 120 
 
Notes: Includes baseline characteristics of the N=628 observations included in a pair of waves 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
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Table 16. Sample of children in non-parental care (Table 7) 
 
  Baseline Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Subsidy Recipient 41.3 46.4 46.3 44.8 38.9 
Type of care 
    Center 35.7 45.4 51.9 49.7 48.4 
FCC 13.4 13.0 11.1 10.3 11.1 
FFN 50.9 41.5 37.0 40.0 40.5 
Parental care only N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Child Sex 
     Female 49.8 50.2 49.5 49.7 48.4 
Male 50.2 49.8 50.5 50.3 51.6 
Child age 
     Infant 30.0 19.3 8.9 0.0 0.0 
Toddler 29.0 28.0 26.8 27.3 16.7 
Preschooler 36.7 46.9 51.6 66.7 59.5 
School age 4.2 5.8 12.6 6.1 23.8 
Child race 
     White, non-Hispanic 30.4 30.9 33.2 30.9 31.0 
Hispanic 12.0 8.7 8.4 8.5 6.3 
Non-White, non-Hispanic 57.6 60.4 58.4 60.6 62.7 
Single parent 68.6 64.7 60.5 59.4 69.0 
Resp. Education 
    Less than high school 24.7 22.7 21.6 22.4 19.0 
High school 34.6 32.9 35.3 33.9 32.5 
Some college 36.4 38.6 36.8 37.6 43.7 
BA+ 4.2 5.8 6.3 6.1 4.8 
Resp. employment 
    None 55.5 41.7 34.9 34.5 26.2 
Part-time 19.4 14.6 16.4 10.3 21.4 
Full-time 25.1 43.7 48.7 55.2 52.4 
Resp. in education/training 25.4 24.2 17.9 17.0 17.5 
Household income 
    Under $15,000 54.1 58.0 47.4 43.6 39.7 
$15,000-$29,999 34.6 26.1 35.3 40.6 31.0 
$30,000+ 11.3 15.9 17.4 15.8 29.4 
Welfare 71.4 62.8 52.6 41.8 37.3 
Family or friend available to care for 
child 55.5 55.6 52.6 50.6 57.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Means           
Number of other adults 0.74 0.74 0.65 0.68 0.60 
Number of children under six 1.41 1.34 1.41 1.40 1.33 
Number of children 6-12 0.35 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.63 
N (observations)  283 207 190 165 126 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 




Table 17. Sample of all children (Table 8) 
 
  Baseline Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Subsidy Recipient 37.5 39.6 42.2 38.8 33.6 
Type of care 
    Center 31.3 37.6 45.2 41.8 41.8
FCC 11.8 10.8 9.7 8.7 9.6 
FFN 44.6 34.4 32.3 33.7 34.9 
Parental care only 12.4 17.2 12.9 15.8 13.7 
Child Sex 
     Female 51.1 50.0 50.5 50.0 47.9 
Male 48.9 50.0 49.5 50.0 52.1 
Child age 
     Infant 30.7 19.2 8.3 0.0 0.0
Toddler 27.9 28.4 28.0 27.6 17.8 
Preschooler 36.2 46.8 50.0 62.8 56.8 
School age 5.3 5.6 13.8 9.7 25.3 
Child race 
     White, non-Hispanic 29.1 30.4 30.7 29.6 31.5
Hispanic 13.0 11.2 9.6 9.7 8.9 
Non-White, non-Hispanic 57.9 58.4 59.6 60.7 59.6 
Single parent 63.8 60.8 57.3 58.7 62.3 
Resp. Education 
    Less than high school 25.7 23.6 23.9 23.0 22.6
High school 34.1 34.8 35.3 34.7 31.5 
Some college 35.9 36.8 35.3 37.2 41.1 
BA+ 4.3 4.8 5.5 5.1 4.8 
Resp. employment 
    None 57.9 45.8 36.9 37.8 30.8
Part-time 18.0 14.1 15.7 12.8 20.5 
Full-time 24.1 40.2 47.5 49.5 48.6 
Resp. in education/training 24.1 23.6 16.1 17.3 17.8 
Household income 
    Under $15,000 53.3 57.2 50.0 46.4 38.4 
$15,000-$29,999 34.4 28.8 33.9 38.8 30.8 
$30,000+ 12.4 14.0 16.1 14.8 30.8 
Welfare 71.2 61.2 53.7 42.9 37.0 
Family or friend available to care for 
child 53.9 54.0 54.6 52.1 58.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Means           
Number of other adults 0.75 0.77 0.69 0.69 0.64 
Number of children under six 1.46 1.40 1.42 1.39 1.33 
Number of children 6-12 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.53 0.68 
N (observations)  323 250 218 196 146 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
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Table 18. Sample of children for number of providers model (Table 9) 
 
  Baseline Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Subsidy Recipient 43.2 47.3 46.3 44.8 39.5 
Type of care 
    Center 35.9 45.8 52.4 49.7 48.4
FCC 13.2 13.3 10.7 9.8 11.3 
FFN 50.9 40.9 36.9 40.5 40.3 
Parental care only N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Child Sex 
     Female 48.6 49.8 49.5 49.1 47.6 
Male 51.4 50.2 50.5 50.9 52.4 
Child age 
     Infant 29.1 19.7 9.0 0.0 0.0
Toddler 29.5 28.1 26.6 27.0 16.9 
Preschooler 37.3 46.3 52.1 66.9 58.9 
School age 4.1 5.9 12.2 6.1 24.2 
Child race 
     White, non-Hispanic 30.9 30.5 33.0 30.7 31.5
Hispanic 8.6 8.9 8.5 8.6 6.5 
Non-White, non-Hispanic 60.5 60.6 58.5 60.7 62.1 
Single parent 69.1 65.5 60.1 59.5 70.2 
Resp. Education 
    Less than high school 23.6 22.7 21.3 22.7 19.4
High school 35.0 33.0 35.6 33.1 32.3 
Some college 36.8 38.4 36.7 38.0 43.5 
BA+ 4.5 5.9 6.4 6.1 4.8 
Resp. employment 
    None 54.1 41.9 34.6 34.4 26.6
Part-time 19.5 13.8 16.5 10.4 21.0 
Full-time 26.4 44.3 48.9 55.2 52.4 
Resp. in education/training 25.5 24.6 17.6 16.6 17.7 
Household income 
    Under $15,000 52.7 58.1 47.3 43.6 39.5 
$15,000-$29,999 34.1 26.6 35.1 41.1 31.5 
$30,000+ 13.2 15.3 17.6 15.3 29.0 
Welfare 68.2 62.6 52.7 41.7 37.1 
Family or friend available to care for 
child 56.4 55.2 52.7 50.9 56.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Means           
Number of other adults 0.70 0.73 0.65 0.69 0.59 
Number of children under six 1.40 1.35 1.40 1.40 1.31 
Number of children 6-12 0.33 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.63 
N (observations)  220 203 188 163 124 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
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Table 19. Sample of children for quality of care model (Table 11) 
 
  Baseline Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Subsidy Recipient 38.3 43.2 47.5 46.0 39.4 
Type of care 
    Center 36.2 45.3 53.2 51.8 50.5
FCC 10.7 8.1 8.9 7.2 9.2 
FFN 53.0 46.6 38.0 41.0 40.4 
Parental care only N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Child Sex 
     Female 49.7 49.3 48.1 48.2 46.8 
Male 50.3 50.7 51.9 51.8 53.2 
Child age 
     Infant 22.8 19.6 9.5 0.0 0.0
Toddler 32.9 25.7 24.1 26.6 18.3 
Preschooler 39.6 49.3 55.7 68.3 56.9 
School age 4.7 5.4 10.8 5.0 24.8 
Child race 
     White, non-Hispanic 26.8 27.7 32.3 29.5 28.4
Hispanic 8.7 9.5 10.1 9.4 7.3 
Non-White, non-Hispanic 64.4 62.8 57.6 61.2 64.2 
Single parent 70.5 66.2 62.7 59.7 70.6 
Resp. Education 
    Less than high school 22.8 22.3 20.3 23.7 19.3
High school 34.9 31.1 33.5 28.8 27.5 
Some college 37.6 39.9 40.5 41.0 47.7 
BA+ 4.7 6.8 5.7 6.5 5.5 
Resp. employment 
    None 57.7 41.9 31.6 35.3 25.7
Part-time 22.8 14.9 17.7 10.8 22.0 
Full-time 19.5 43.2 50.6 54.0 52.3 
Resp. in education/training 27.5 25.0 17.1 15.8 16.5 
Household income 
    Under $15,000 53.7 60.1 47.5 43.9 40.4 
$15,000-$29,999 32.9 25.7 36.1 41.0 32.1 
$30,000+ 13.4 14.2 16.5 15.1 27.5 
Welfare 71.1 64.9 53.8 42.4 36.7 
Family or friend available to care for 
child 59.7 60.8 57.0 51.1 56.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Means           
Number of other adults 0.62 0.72 0.65 0.69 0.57 
Number of children under six 1.41 1.32 1.36 1.40 1.30 
Number of children 6-12 0.33 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.61 
N (observations)  149 148 158 139 109 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Minnesota survey data (characteristics, outcome) and 
administrative data (subsidy status) 
 
 
